Abstract
In this paper I criticize Cartwright's analysis of capacities and offer an alternative analysis. I argue that Cartwright's attempt to connect capacities to her condition CC fails because individuals can exercise capacities only in certain contexts. My own analysis emphasizes three features of capacities: 1) Capacities belong to individuals; 2) Capacities are typically not metaphysically fundamental properties of individuals, but can be explained by referring to structural properties of individuals; and 3) Laws are best understood as ascriptions of capacities.
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 1997 |
Disciplines
- Philosophy
- Philosophy of Mind
- Philosophy of Science
- Psychology
- Theory and Philosophy
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